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Investigating the recent direct action campaigns against genetically-modified crops in 
France and the UK, we set out to understand how contrasting judicial systems and 
cultures affect the way that activists choose to commit ostensibly illegal actions, and 
how they negotiate the trade-offs between effectiveness and public accountability. We 
find evidence that prosecution outcomes across different judicial systems are 
consistent and relatively predictable, and consequently argue that the concept of a 
‘judicial opportunity structure’ is useful for developing our understanding of social 
movement trajectories. We also find that these differential judicial opportunities 
cannot adequately account for the tactical choices made by activists with respect to 
the staging of covert or overt direct action; rather, explanations of tactical choice are 
better accounted for by movement ideas, cultures, and traditions. 
 





This article examines an empirical puzzle that arises from differences between campaigns of 
sabotage against genetically-modified organisms (henceforth: GMOs) in the United Kingdom 
and France, since 1997. In France, most activists committed open, public, mass ‘civic 
disobedience’ against GM crops, in broad daylight, as part of a nationally coordinated 
citizens’ campaign. But in the UK, activists were split between accountable, public, and 
symbolic actions, and covert, anonymous, usually nocturnal, destruction. Most ‘crop-
trashing’ in the UK was covert, and most activists preferred to avoid arrest and trial; most 
crop-trashing in France has been overt, with most activists accepting arrest and trial as a 
necessary cost of their action. How can we account for these tactical divergences? Given the 
similar strategic aims of crop-trashing, we aim to do so by looking at one highly relevant area 
of systemic difference between France and the UK: the structure and operation of the 
criminal justice system. We thus investigate how an external structure (the judicial system) 
interacts with internal ideological debates to explain differences in the tactical choices made 
by movements. 
 
Why accord such importance to the criminal justice system? Clearly, it will be of relatively 
minor (though, clearly also, not nil) significance for collective actors not engaged in direct 
action. However, for policy-oriented campaigns of deliberate law breaking, the criminal 
justice system provides a crucial site of intermediation between state and movement; it is 
logical to assume that where actors are (i) involved in illegal activity with the goal of 
achieving policy change and (ii) seeking to minimise the costs and maximise the advantages 
of their action, the operative judicial system will be a key factor in (a) the decisions made by 
movement actors to undertake illegal action, (b) the design of the action, and (c) the 
consequent positions adopted by movement actors with respect to judicial proceedings. We 
might thus expect that given the nature of the campaigns against GM crops, activists who 
3 
 
have chosen a strategy based on direct action (and thus which is likely to lead to arrest) will 
choose tactics likely to maximise their success chances in relation to the judicial system. But 
we expect also that collective identity – ‘the shared definition of a group that derives from its 
members’ common interests and solidarity’ (Taylor, 1989, p.771) – is likely to be crucial to 
the way that movements negotiate their choices within these structural contexts (Polletta & 
Jasper, 2001; Armstrong & Bernstein, 2008; Taylor, 2010). Movements, after all, often differ 
internally over both strategy and tactics, and these differences suggest that ideas play a role in 
determining what actors see as appropriate forms of action (Smithey, 2009). As Johnston 
argues,  
 
most scholars would probably agree that a complete analysis of social movement 
mobilization requires some mix of elements focusing on perception/interpretation […] 
as well as those elements that capture the compelling and constraining qualities of 
‘hard’ institutional arrangements – meaning opportunities that compel action 
straightforwardly and threats that constrain automatically – both requiring little 
interpretative creativity. The question is how to sort out the appropriate mix. (2011, 
p.49) 
 
In practice, efforts to do this are very rare, probably because it is very difficult to do with any 
clarity: a mix of institutional determination and contingent interpretation militates against 
clear causal analysis. We seek to overcome this difficulty through a close comparison of 
crop-trashing in the UK and France, testing two rival hypotheses: that (i) external (judicial) 
institutions and (ii) movement ideas are the decisive factors in explaining the tactical choices 
of activists. We proceed therefore by the method of paired comparison. As a comparative 
method, this has some advantages over both single case studies and large n comparisons 
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(Tarrow, 2010, pp.243-6); first, because it allows for more intimate analysis based on deeper 
background knowledge than is available in the latter method; second, because it enables the 
assessment of the impact of a single variable or mechanism (in this case, judicial institutions) 
across systems, which the single national case study is unable to achieve. Our comparison is 
therefore based on a ‘most different cases’ research design. 
 
In section I, therefore, we briefly discuss the importance of criminal justice systems to the 
institutional contexts of social movements, before setting out the key differences between the 
organization and operation of the judicial systems in the UK and France. The British and 
French judicial regimes are each is the mother lode of a distinct legal tradition: civil law in 
France, and common law in England (and Wales). Balas et al (2009) underline that 
substantive and procedural legal rules and regulations differ systematically between countries 
that have adopted these traditions; systemic differences include approaches to collecting 
evidence, the importance of trial, the selection and function of judges, the degree of 
procedural formalisation, the importance of case law, and the role of juries (see also David & 
Jauffret-Spinosi, 2002, pp.10-11). Moreover, comparing British and French anti-GMO 
activism in English and French judicial settings provides us with a third, ‘control’ case, 
because Scotland’s judicial system is a ‘mixed jurisdiction’, combining elements of both 
legal traditions. We set out our hypotheses at the end of section I. 
 
In section II, we test these hypotheses, drawing the contours of the anti-GM crop campaigns 
in France and the UK, discussing the staging of direct action, and subsequent prosecutions. In 
section III we discuss movement debates about attitudes towards arrest and trial, paying 
particular attention to debates over public accountability in each movement. Our data is 
drawn from over ten years of study of environmental protest in the UK and France, including 
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interviews with movement activists, observations of activist meetings and criminal trials, 
supplemented by reports drawn from the activist and mass media (for our previous work on 
these and related movements, see Doherty, 1999; 2003; 2007; Hayes, 2002; 2006; 2007; 
Doherty & Hayes, 2011). Data for the UK draws on material from a research project on UK 
environmental direct action, which involved a close reading of activist newsletters, and 
interviews with fifteen activists; data for France is derived from similar sources and 
processes, including eleven interviews with key informants.1 Following the completion of the 
research we carried out follow-up interviews, and an extensive survey of newspaper reports 
in the British and French press. All the written sources we cite are publicly available, but 
interviewees’ names have been anonymized, except for publicly recognised figures. 
 
 
I Structuring Difference: Criminal Justice Systems, Legal and Judicial Opportunity 
The literature on political opportunity structures counts the independence of the judicial 
system as a key variable in its determination of state capacity (Tarrow, 1998; Meyer & 
Minkoff, 2004); states which have an independent judiciary and where there is extensive 
legal codification offer greater checks and balances on executive power. Consequently – and 
bearing in mind that this is but one variable within a complex series – challenging groups 
may enjoy greater opportunities for effective opposition to governmental policies, projects, or 
programmes, and may further be reasonably expected to adopt more moderate forms of 
protest. However, where states do not have a fully independent judiciary or extensive legal 
codification, opposition movements have fewer systemic means for opposition or redress. 
Where effective opportunities are lacking, social movements can be expected to adopt more 
conflictual forms of protest and develop dissent on specific issues into more general critiques 




The judiciary is thus typically associated in political opportunity analyses with the strength or 
effectiveness of policy implementation (Kitschelt, 1986, pp.63-5). Discussion of potential 
systemic openness and exclusion focuses on the legal instruments available to either the state 
(such as injunctions) or to protesters (such as the codification of rights, or the development 
of, say, environmental law; see, for example, Dryzek et al, 2003, pp.30-4, pp.50-4). Legal 
and judicial systems are thus important to our conception of movement mobilization, 
although they have received relatively little sustained attention in this context.  
 
Where analysis has examined the relationships between social movements and the law, the 
predominant focus has been on ‘legal mobilization’, where ‘law provides both normative 
principles and strategic resources for the conduct of social struggle [and] is mobilized when a 
desire or want is translated into an assertion of right or lawful claim’ (McCann, 2004, p.508). 
A series of collections brought together by Sarat and Scheingold (1998, 2005a, 2006) has 
examined the role of cause lawyers in such mobilizations, stressing not only their advocacy 
but also their ideological contribution, helping movements ‘define the realm of the possible’ 
(Sarat & Scheingold, 2005b, p.10). Stressing a bottom-up, ‘support-structure explanation’ for 
the ‘rights revolution’ of increased judicial attention to and support for individual rights that 
has taken place in the USA over the past fifty years, Epp (1998) also underlines the key role 
played by rights-advocacy lawyers in bringing this about, in conjunction with the 
development of movement organizations articulating rights claims. 
 
Within this tradition of legal mobilization, a number of commentators have recently argued 
that the concept of legal opportunity structure should be seen as distinct from political 
opportunity structure, and can provide a more thorough understanding of the role of legal 
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strategies in protest (Hilson, 2002; 2009). For Andersen, legal and political opportunity are 
differentiated by framing operations: movements engaged in litigation are constrained in their 
interpretive schema, such that they ‘must articulate their claims so that they fall within the 
categories previously established by an amalgam of constitutional, statutory, administrative, 
common, and case law’ which in turn ‘shape the progress and outcome of movement claims 
in important ways’ (2006, p.12). 
 
The contributions of the legal mobilization literature to our understanding of the interplay 
between social movements and the law are important ones. However, the predominant focus 
here is on litigation as an offensive tactic. Analyses typically focus on the furtherance of 
rights-based claims making, particularly in the context of judicial review and constitutional 
courts (e.g. Smith, 2005; Andersen, 2006; Wilson & Cordero, 2006; Barclay et al, 2009; 
Vanhala, 2009a; Vanhala, 2009b); there is a focus on North America. Explicitly cross-
national comparative analysis is rare (Epp 1998 being an exception). Explanations of activist 
tactics within contrasting judicial traditions and systems has been curiously overlooked, with 
systemic differences typically situated at the macro-level, such as between liberal and 
authoritarian regimes (e.g. Sarat & Scheingold, 1998). 
 
Our paper proposes two developments of this literature, therefore: we compare movement 
activism in the specific context of contrasting judicial systems; and we focus on cases where 
social movement actors come before the courts not for reasons of litigation, but rather for 
those of prosecution, for their involvement in direct action. This question seems to us to be 
all the more important because, as Barkan points out (2006, p.183), the prosecutions and 
trials of political activists are ‘normal events in the life cycle of many protest movements’. 
Yet – Barkan aside – prosecutions for collective action have rarely been investigated within 
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the social movement literature, whilst the tactical, discursive and ethical problems and 
possibilities posed by defences against prosecution entail a different set of opportunities from 
those of ‘legal opportunity’, for two reasons.  
 
First, this is because prosecution and litigation bring movement actors into different cultural 
and legal arenas. Second, this is because it is important to separate judicial from legal 
opportunities in movement terms. Vanhala includes acts of civil disobedience in her 
discussion of litigation strategies (‘reactive litigation’), but also recognises the division of 
labour within social movement campaigns, with some groups adopting direct action and 
others lobbying or litigation strategies (2009a, p.741, p.752). As the argument we develop 
here will suggest, it is important not to reduce direct action a priori to a form of civil 
disobedience, a concern with rights, or a desire to force a change in the law. It is also 
important to underline that direct action and litigation imply different skillsets, mobilising 
frameworks, resources, and institutional relationships. Indeed, as Ollitrault (2008) underlines 
with respect to the French environmental movement, the development of legal strategies by 
social movement actors implies both their progressive institutionalisation and the existence of 
a membership with specialized resources. In contrast, actions which result in prosecution in 
the courts require (at least a priori) few specialised resources, and are open to mass collective 
participation. To borrow Zirakzadeh’s phrase (2006, p.5), participants involved in disruptive 
action walk on a different side of the legal fence from those involved in litigation. 
 
Comparing France and the UK is thus intriguing given the very different judicial systems and 
cultures which prevail in these two countries. Of course, there are some similarities between 
the English and French systems which are particularly relevant to direct action: in both 
countries, activists arrested for the same offence are tried collectively, and have the option of 
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mounting a ‘lawful excuse’ defence (under the 1971 Criminal Damage Act in England and 
Wales, or by invoking an état de nécessité under article 122-7 of the penal code in France). 
Activists can therefore argue (as crop-trashers have in both countries) that a given act of law 
breaking was committed in order to stop a greater one; they may also call witnesses to 
contextualise and substantiate their defence. Beyond these important commonalities, 
however, there are significant structural differences between the two systems.  
 
The first relates to the operation of juries. The common law tradition asserts individual 
freedoms over state prerogatives: the principle of jury trial delegates control over 
adjudication to the ‘lay judges’ of juries (La Porta et al, 2002, p.8). In England, this option is 
open to activists brought before Crown Courts, though not for minor criminal offences, which 
are heard without a jury in Magistrates’ Courts (where criminal damage is involved, the 
figure of £5000 acts as a threshold; jury trials are only possible only where damage is 
estimated to be above this figure). In France, juries only operate in the assize courts (cours 
d’assises), which deal with major criminal cases (‘crimes’, defined by prospective sentences 
of at least ten years in prison). Less serious offences (‘délits’) are held in tribunaux 
correctionnels before a magistrate, normally accompanied by two assessors. For anti-GMO 
activists prosecuted in France, therefore, there is effectively no option of a jury trial; verdicts 
are handed down by magistrates. A second important distinction concerns the importance of 
precedent. Case law, or the body of law as derived from the decisions and practices of the 
courts, is the cornerstone of the English common law system (Simpson, 1973, p.94; Wesley-
Smith, 1994, p.8), which thus grants considerable discretion and independence to judges 
(though in routine criminal cases, English courts are bound by precedent from higher courts). 
In contrast, the civil law tradition conceives law as a system of rules, the imposition of statute 
(La Porta et al, 2002, p.9). As a result, jurisprudential reasoning plays a minor role only in 
10 
 
French civil law; formally, French judges enjoy neither significant levels of freedom from 
political interference nor flexibility and power to shape the law through their decisions. 
Judicial independence in France remains frequently compromised by explicit government 
intervention in the terms of prosecution and the application of sentences (there is, indeed, 
substantial evidence of direct ministerial intervention in both policing and judicial decisions 
on anti-GMO activists, for example). 
 
Scotland provides an intermediate case. It has a mixed legal system: its post-Renaissance 
foundations are based, like the French civil law tradition, on Roman law; but, in contrast to 
the Napoleonic codification of civil law at the heart of the French tradition, Scottish law 
remains uncodified and, following the 1707 Act of Union with England and the Napoleonic 
wars a century later, its subsequent development has been highly influenced by the English 
legal tradition (Tetley, 1999; Walker, 2001). For our purposes, the mixed nature of the 
Scottish system provides a control for our investigation of the influence of criminal justice 
systems and activist ideas on tactical choice. Whilst anti-GMO activists in Scotland belonged 
to the same networks as those in England and Wales and are thus part of the same national 
anti-GMO movement, the court procedure in criminal cases differs in Scotland from that in 
England and Wales, and in key respects is structurally similar to the French procedure: jury 
trials are only available in Scotland for serious crimes (‘solemn procedure’), whilst less 
serious crimes (those for which the maximum penalties are twelve months in prison and a 
£10,000 fine) such as crop-trashing are judged either by a magistrate or justice of the peace 
sitting alone, or by three justices of the peace sitting together (‘summary procedure’). 
Comparison with the tactical choices of Scottish activists should therefore enable us to 




What then can we expect the effect of these structural and operational differences to be on the 
conduct of illegal direct action against GMOs in Scotland, France, and England? We suggest 
that it produces a first set of two hypotheses concerning what we might term a judicial 
opportunity structure: 
 
P1.the structural differences between criminal justice systems will have a 
significant impact on the prosecution outcomes of activists tried for non-violent 
direct action; 
 
P2. In seeking to undertake an effective direct action campaign, activists will 
make tactical choices which reflect these differential success chances. 
 
 
II Comparing Anti-GMO Movements 
Crop-trashing has taken place in several European countries, but to date by far the most 
sustained campaigns have been in the UK and France. Since 1997 in both countries, activists 
have carried out numerous actions against open field trials of GM crops, authorised on a 
pluri-annual basis by the respective bio-scientific regulatory authorities of each state, and 
managed by public research institutes and/or bio-technology multi-nationals (such as Aventis 
(later Bayer), Monsanto, Pioneer, BASF, Limagrain, Syngenta). In France, activists have also 
targeted plantations of Monsanto MON810 corn, as commercial cultivation – previously 
negligible – increased dramatically between 2005-7. Since the end of the main crop trials in 
the UK in 2003 and an effective moratorium on GM crops in France since 2008, there has 
only been sporadic action, as the cultivation of GM crops has been in abeyance in both 
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countries (though there is considerable direct action in France against some sunflower strains 
considered by activists to be ‘second-generation’ GMOs). 
 
Direct action against GM crops in the UK and France was only one part of a broader 
campaign in which NGOs, independent scientists, and consumer groups lobbied government, 
biotech corporations, and food producers, and engaged in public information campaigns. This 
broad anti-GMO movement developed apace within the EU once GM soy beans began to 
arrive in European ports in 1996 (Ansell et al, 2006; Schurman & Munro, 2009). Greenpeace 
was a leading and early actor in the anti-GMO campaigns across Europe, organising 
blockades at ports including Liverpool and Saint Nazaire in 1996, and co-ordinating 
transnational action at EU level (Purdue, 2000; Ansell et al, 2006). Greenpeace UK carried 
out a high-profile crop-trash at Lyng in Norfolk in 1999, which along with the subsequent 
acquittal of the 28 participants by juries in two trials, gained more coverage than any other 
single crop-trash in the UK. But this was a one-off, media-oriented action, and although 
Greenpeace remained a vital part of national and European lobby-based campaigns, in the 
UK and France other groups emerged which acted independently of it, using sabotage 
(including crop-trashing) as a principal tactic. It is these groups that are the subject of this 
study.  
 
In France, the leading role has been played by the leftist peasant farmers’ union La 
Confédération paysanne (CP) which has undertaken direct action against GM crops since 
1997, and whose leading activists have become the public face of the campaign (particularly 
José Bové, now a Europe-Ecologie MEP). In 2003, faced with the end of a five-year EU 
moratorium on GM crops, the CP helped launch the Faucheurs volontaires (FV) ‘civic 
disobedience’ campaign of overt, public crop-trashing, alongside a series of citizens’, 
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agricultural, and environmental organizations – including Greenpeace France, France Nature 
Environnement, organic farmers’ union the Fédération nationale d’agriculture biologique, 
alter-globalisation organization ATTAC, and Les Amis de la Terre (Friends of the Earth); 
some 7000 individual activists have formally registered as Faucheurs, signing a written 
undertaking (discussed in more detail in section III). Organizationally, although mindful of 
local autonomy and eschewing an overtly pyramidal structure, the FV campaign provides 
recognised national leaders, a coordinated national structure and disciplined modus 
operandum for activism, effective legal support for arrested activists, and mediation (with 
activists, organizations, police, court officials, print and broadcast media, political parties, 
state bureaucracy, government) (Hayes, 2007). The FV campaign was, in Bové’s words, 
explicitly devised so that ‘it wasn’t just peasant farmers who undertook actions’, following 
the initial period where the CP ‘essentially acted as a syndicalized organization’.2 It was also 
explicitly devised as a public campaign rather than an organization, in order to protect its 
member organizations financially; it is not registered, for example, as an association under 
French law. Prior to the FV campaign, organizations initiating actions were legally liable for 
compensation claims; the CP in particular was vulnerable to bankruptcy. In the FV campaign, 
however, activists could now only be individually liable, given the FV’s lack of legal status. 
 
In the UK, the organization of direct action against GM crops was much less co-ordinated 
than in France, with no national membership organization and no publicly identifiable 
leaders. Crop-trashing was principally carried out by informal locally-based groups of radical 
environmental activists who had developed direct action techniques in campaigns against the 
Conservative government’s roads and airport expansion programmes in the mid-1990s (Wall, 
2000; Thomas, 2001). By the time that GM crops became a significant issue around 1998, 
they already had substantial experience of occupying sites, damaging property, and 
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committing illegal action (Seel et al, 2000; Plows et al, 2004; Doherty, 2007). The relative 
success of these actions reinforced their belief that illegal and disruptive protest action could 
be effective and win significant public support. These activists were linked through a loose 
network of local groups known as Earth First! (EF!). EF! had no formal membership, no 
bureaucratic structure or office-holders, held only occasional national strategy gatherings 
and, in contrast to the FV, had no charter defining legitimate actions. Nominally distinct 
groups such as Reclaim the Streets, Corporate Watch, and genetiX snowball (gXs) 
overlapped with EF! (Wall, 2000) as part of the same ‘movement community’ (Meyer & 
Staggenborg, 2007); activists from all of these groups took part in the same protests and 
meetings, acting as individuals rather than as representatives of separate groups. They carried 
out both public and covert crop-trashing and other actions against bio-tech corporations and 
the food industry, including office occupations, and disruptive protests inside supermarkets 
and against their distribution networks. In public actions they would often be acting alongside 
a broader range of actors, including activists from more mainstream green NGOs, local 
residents, and farmers campaigning against a particular GM crop trial site. 
 
There are a number of differences therefore in the organizations and movement traditions 
underpinning each campaign. Most significantly for our study, there were also fundamental 
differences in how the courts dealt with those arrested and charged for crop-trashing. The 
much publicised Greenpeace UK acquittals were part of a broader pattern in England where 
over the previous ten years, ‘prosecutions of protesters against new roads and nuclear, 
chemical and arms trade companies collapsed after defendants argued that they had lawful 
excuse, had acted according to their consciences and that they were trying to prevent a 
greater crime’.3 In 2000-01 the Crown Prosecution Service lost three major trials against 
crop-trashers, and this trend has carried on since the scaling-down of anti-GMO activism: 
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juries have acquitted Greenpeace climate change activists at Maidstone crown court in 2008 
(for trespass at E.On’s Kingsnorth coal power station), peace campaigners at Bristol crown 
court in 2007 (for damaging B-52 bombers at Fairford airbase prior to the Iraq war) and at 
Brighton crown court in 2010 (for breaking into and damaging the premises of EDO, a 
defence equipment manufacturer that had supplied the Israeli army). 
 
Only one jury trial of crop-trashers produced a conviction (in 2003, for an action in 2001); 
the two activists found guilty received fines. This contrasts both with the Greenpeace case 
discussed above, and the acquittal of two activists at Worcester in November 2001 as the jury 
accepted their lawful excuse defence.4 But even where defendants were found guilty, they 
received lenient sentences. In December 2000, five activists were found guilty of pulling up 
GM oilseed rape at a research farm in County Durham, in a non-jury trial; the judge 
pronounced a conditional discharge, and the activists were not ordered to pay compensation 
to either the biotech company (Aventis CropScience) or the farmer. In a written judgment, 
Judge Firth praised their motives, saying that any reasonable person would have pulled up 
more trial sites, and sooner.5 In June 2001, charges of aggravated trespass were dropped 
against seven activists who had destroyed GM crops near Sherborne in Dorset; the same 
month, on procedural grounds, a district judge acquitted 11 activists of criminal damage for 
the destruction of an Aventis farm-scale trial near Wivenhoe in Essex.6 In addition, gXs 
activists successfully appealed against conviction for a crop-trash in Cambridge, with the 
judge deciding that it had been wrong to charge them with aggravated trespass (a public order 
offence tried before magistrates), which would have meant that they had no right to make a 
public interest defence.7 In several further cases, charges were dropped, even when the 
evidence of crop trashing was clear (Thomas, 2001, pp.342-3). As an activist newsletter 
reported, ‘The Crown became somewhat reluctant to press for damages of over £5000 
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because this gives activists the right to ask for a trial by jury rather than a magistrate’.8 
Prosecutors would claim that there had been hardly any damage; campaigners would claim 
that they had in fact caused plenty, in order to try to get a jury trial.  
 
In France, the story is somewhat different. Between the first trial at Agen in February 1998 
and the most recent, at Colmar in September 2011, courts in a further 21 different towns have 
heard a further 26 prosecutions for crop destruction, with twelve verdicts taken to appeal. 
Activists have consistently pleaded a ‘necessity’ defence, arguing that their action was 
designed to stop a greater harm, and (since September 2005 in particular) calling expert 
witnesses, such as molecular biologists Jacques Testart and Christian Vélot, to challenge the 
government-industry position on the safety of GM crops. ‘Since we cannot have a public 
debate, we’ll transform the courts into a debating chamber on GMOs’, argued Bové.9 In trials 
at Orléans in December 2005 and Versailles in January 2006, where the presiding magistrates 
were (according to molecular biologist Claude Seureau, who acted as an expert witness for 
the defence in these and two other trials) particularly interested in encouraging scientific 
debate within the courtroom, magistrates acquitted activists on similar grounds to those put 
forward in English jury verdicts, agreeing that the actions of the defendants were ‘urgent and 
necessary’, citing the risk of cross-contamination.10 For the Faucheurs’ campaign, these 
verdicts constituted ‘a right to destroy for each citizen, and an obligation to prohibit for the 
State’.11 In June 2008, at Chartres, 58 activists were acquitted, the court again agreeing with 
the defendants that they had acted legitimately out of necessity. 
 
Yet these have proven to be exceptional cases. All three of these verdicts were overturned on 
appeal: 48 of the 49 defendants acquitted at Orléans subsequently received suspended prison 
sentences of two months, with the 49th sentenced to two months in gaol; the nine activists 
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acquitted at Versailles, all members of the CP, were sentenced to three months, suspended; 
all 58 acquitted at Chartres received three month suspended sentences plus fines of €1000, 
with the fine increased for the five who were recidivists. More fundamentally, acquittals were 
the exception rather than the rule: activists have otherwise consistently received short 
suspended prison sentences and relatively small fines, and sometimes been ordered to pay 
substantial damages (such as the €100,000 imposed by the Toulouse criminal court in 
November 2005 on eight movement leaders). The range of sentences imposed on 41 activists 
at Toulouse in September 2008 is perhaps typical: heavy fines for five recidivist activists 
(including Bové), and suspended sentences of one or two months for the remaining activists. 
 
A clear pattern therefore emerges from the trial records. Activists have repeatedly been 
convicted in France, and repeatedly been acquitted, or had charges dropped, in England. In 
France, compensation claims from biotechnology companies have sometimes resulted in the 
award of substantial damages, to be paid by activists; on no occasion has this been the case in 
England, where judges have conspicuously rejected such claims on several occasions. In 
France, even if sentences have frequently been more lenient than demanded by state 
prosecutors, they have also been consistently heavier than on the rare occasions where 
activists have been found guilty in England.  
 
What about the Scottish cases? The activists prosecuted in Scotland belonged to the same 
groups as in England, and carried out their actions in much the same ways – a mix of covert 
action by EF! and related groups, while other groups of local campaigners (typically working 
with experienced green activists) took public actions that often led to arrest. As noted, the 
criminal justice system in Scotland does not allow activists the same opportunities for jury 
trial as in England; in Scotland, magistrates have thus always tried crop-trashers. Between 
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July 2002 and March 2003, separate groups of Scottish activists were convicted of anti-GMO 
crop-trashing on six occasions.12 Though fines have been small in Scotland, the evidence here 
seems to bear out the hypothesis that there are structural differences in outcomes between 
criminal justice systems. Indeed, one married couple experienced these differences first-hand 
when they undertook separate actions in Scotland and England: though her husband had been 
acquitted for his avowed participation in the Greenpeace action in Norfolk, Helena Beveridge 
was convicted by Aberdeen Sheriff’s court in May 2002 for causing an estimated £4000 
worth of damage to a GMO crop-trial one year before. As she commented: ‘I think it is 
bizarre that my husband, Alastair, can do the exact same thing with Greenpeace activists in 
Norwich and be acquitted, yet I am guilty’.13 An activist website made the point: ‘yes, but 
Alistair had a jury!’.14 
 
What then of our hypotheses about a judicial opportunity structure? The evidence from our 
comparison of direct action prosecutions in the UK and France tends to confirm the first of 
our hypotheses, P1: the structural differences between criminal justice systems have a 
significant impact on the prosecution outcomes of activists tried for non-violent direct action. 
Yet what of the second hypothesis P2 – that activists will make tactical choices which reflect 
these differential success chances? Here, the evidence is intriguing. We might expect to see 
three related dynamics: first, that we would find similar tactics in France and Scotland; 
second, that these would be markedly different from those we would find in England; third, 
that – given the likelihood of conviction in France and Scotland, and acquittal in England – 
activists in England would adopt more open and public tactics, and activists in Scotland and 
France more covert tactics. However, when we compare the tactical choices of the British 
and French direct action campaigns against GMOs, hypothesis P2 is not supported. In fact, 
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we discover something far more interesting than a purely structural reading based on 
comparing judicial systems would provide: 
 
(i) in France, anti-GMO activists enacted crop-trashing as a form of public civic 
disobedience, accepting arrest and the right of the state to try them, despite the fact 
that they were very likely to be convicted and receive financial penalties and 
suspended prison sentences (thus raising the costs of future participation in direct 
action); 
(ii) in England, most activists chose to pursue crop-trashing covertly, despite the fact that 
they were very likely to be acquitted, and have the charges minimised, or dropped, 
when arrested for public actions; 
(iii) there was no discernible difference between the tactics adopted by activists in 
Scotland and England, despite the fact that the criminal justice systems in these 
countries produced consistently and predictably different prosecution outcomes. 
 
Crucially, then, the difference in judicial systems in different parts of the UK has not 
produced difference in tactical choice, whilst the broad similarity of these institutional 
arrangements in France and Scotland has not produced similarity of tactical choice. The 
systemic properties of the judicial system do not seem to influence the likelihood that 
activists will undertake covert action: whether in favourable or unfavourable systems, British 
activists behave in the same way; unfavourable systems (France, Scotland) produce divergent 
(and counter-intuitive) activist tactical choices. How might we explain this? For an 






III Constructing Accountability 
In each movement, arguments over effectiveness and accountability are fundamental and 
revealing. As we shall see, not all those involved in the direct action networks in either 
country agreed on the tactics adopted. In Britain, there was a heated argument between those 
who favoured covert nocturnal sabotage with the aim of destroying as much of the crop as 
possible, and those committed to what they called ‘accountable actions’ involving symbolic 
amounts of destruction. This latter tactic was associated with genetiX snowball, formed in 
1998; some of its founders had been active in campaigns against nuclear weapons and the 
arms trade since the 1980s, and later became involved in Earth First! campaigns in the 1990s 
(Wall, 2000). One prominent activist, Angie Zelter, was also one of the four women who had 
stood trial for ‘disarming’ a Hawk jet aircraft with hammers at BAe’s Warton factory in 
January 1996; at Liverpool crown court, they explained their action as necessary because this 
type of aircraft had been sold to the Indonesian Air Force and used to kill civilians in East 
Timor. The jury, accepting that this constituted ‘reasonable grounds’, acquitted them by 
majority verdict. 
 
There was significant overlap between 1990s environmental direct action networks and peace 
and anti-militarist activists, for whom the highpoint of ‘non-violent direct action’ had been 
the peace camps and protests against the deployment of Cruise missiles across western 
Europe in 1983. Like most western European countries (but unlike France), there was a mass 
peace movement in Britain which regularly mobilized hundreds of thousands of activists 
between 1980-87. gXs revived a peace movement repertoire of the mid-1980s, where 
hundreds of activists were arrested in a ‘snowball’ of protests that grew progressively larger; 
gXs aimed to encourage enough people to commit to taking action against GM crop trials to 
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make the government institute a five-year moratorium on all testing and cultivation. The 
methods chosen were non-confrontational and public: protesters informed the farmers and 
police in advance that they would be taking action (although not necessarily when), were 
limited to damaging 100 plants each, acted only in daylight, and were prepared to be arrested 
(genetiX snowball 1999 5.6). One of the gXs founders, Rowan Tilly, described this form of 
action as ‘accountable’: 
 
Accountability is about pro-actively and deliberately telling people about yourself, 
what action you have taken and why you have done it. Being accountable means 
taking action and then explaining what has already happened and your part in it. 
(Tilly, 1998) 
 
Accountability was thus defined as the moral accountability of an individual to their 
conscience. It therefore did not entail an acceptance of the legitimacy of the state or legal 
system, or of the right of the police and courts to arrest and punish them, as its founders 
made clear in debates with others from the Earth First! movement, who accused them of 
being reformist (Leeds Earth First!, 1998). 
 
In France, the Faucheurs volontaires campaign is also premised on accountability. However, 
this is a very different, collective, Republican construction of accountability, and explicitly 
accepts the right of the state to judge activists for their actions. The March 2004 Charte des 
Faucheurs volontaires emphasizes the ‘democratic’, ‘responsible’, and ‘collective’ nature of 
‘citizen action’, actively discouraging individual and covert action, or the use of cutting 
tools; it is recommended that local collectives ‘present themselves publicly in order to affirm 
the citizen character of this legitimate resistance and to attract other volunteers and support’. 
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Activists should carry an identity card in case of arrest (Faucheurs Volontaires 2004). 
Actions are signalled in advance to the media, carried out in broad daylight, à visage 
découvert (unmasked and openly); faced with the choices of state prosecutors to prosecute 
only a handful of activists (often movement leaders), activists have frequently denounced 
themselves to the gendarmerie, provided lists of those involved, developed tactics under 
arrest to bring about collective prosecution and, when all else fails, declared themselves 
comparants volontaires (voluntary defendants). In July 2004, when nine activists were 
arrested for crop destruction at Menville, a further 222 formally declared themselves equally 
responsible, whilst after the arrest of six activists at Marsat the following month, 167 more 
turned themselves in. Though self-denunciation was formally rejected by the instruction of 
justice minister Dominique Perben (Hayes, 2006; 2007), the tactics have generally been 
successful: providing lists of participants has produced numerous mass trials, including 
(alongside the 58 activists tried in Chartres in June 2008, mentioned above) 86 activists in 
Marmande in October 2010 and 60 activists in Colmar in September 2011. It is notable that 
gXs, the British group that seems tactically closest to the FV, explicitly rejected the idea of 
self-denunciation because while they did not seek to evade arrest, neither was arrest the aim 
of the action. 
 
For the FV, accountability before the law has an ethical dimension: submission to arrest is a 
demonstration of the campaign’s commitment to the primacy of the public order. In order to 
join the campaign, activists must sign a document accepting formal responsibility for their 
actions. For Bové,  
 
Even if we don’t know each participant in our civil disobedience actions individually, 
those who are there have undertaken in writing to accept full responsibility for their 
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action. I place great belief in this written engagement, which we require of everyone. 
It is a sort of citizen’s oath, a charter which creates a respect for the collective. It 
produces a great sense of responsibility.15 
 
The illegality of crop destruction is contrasted with the government’s alleged denial of 
democratic consultation and the insufficiency of the national and European regulatory 
frameworks. To accept formal accountability for illegal actions is thus an instrumental as 
well as ethical act, ensuring continued mediatization, public visibility, and political pressure, 
and opening an institutional space to challenge public policy. But it is also a symbolic 
mobilization of the national-cultural repertoire of contention: public action, arrest, trial, and 
sanction create a public space for the enactment of democratic entitlement, and demonstrate 
the Republican nature of the campaign’s citizens’ engagement. The invocation of Republican 
action is explicit: for example, former CP spokesman Jean-Émile Sanchez, on trial in Orléans 
in May 2006, justified his action in the following terms: 
 
Faucheurs oppose the patenting of living beings by multinational companies, that’s 
all. As far as concerns the supposed violence of the action, let’s not forget that our 
Constitution is the result of collective violence committed at the Bastille on 14 July 
1789.16 
 
Specifically French, these discourses found no echo in Britain. In contrast, for both gXs and 
the wider crop-trashing networks, the question of the legitimacy of the court was left to the 
activist to decide, with no effort to establish a collective view. Sanction had a purely tactical 
value: gXs argued that by accepting arrest they could exploit the courts as a public arena to 
challenge injustice. This meant being prepared to engage in legal battles, which seemed a 
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distraction to others. For instance, following the first gXs crop-trash in July 1998, Monsanto 
took out an injunction against gXs to prevent it damaging further crop trials; an activist 
critical of gXs commented: 
 
Anyway at the end of the day Snowball did some small actions, and more and more 
people got injuncted, and they weren’t the kinds of people who need to get injuncted, 
get their houses taken off them - it’s different for us. They got embroiled in these 
court cases, they only pulled up a very small number of crops, they scared off the 
people they were trying to get involved, and it took maybe 10 activists over a year of 
very focused work to pull up a couple of hundred crops whereas covertly doing it the 
same number of activists could have pulled up thousands of crops.17 
 
gXs only undertook actions in 1998-99, disbanding in 2001, once its final court case was 
complete. Nevertheless, its activists continued crop-trashing as individuals, joining several 
local anti-GMO groups in ‘accountable’ actions broadly in line with the guidelines suggested 
in the gXs handbook (genetiX snowball, 1999). But both the ‘accountable’ tactics of gXs and 
the idea of an organization with rules were rejected by most of those who had been most 
active in environmental direct action against roads. The vast majority of crop-trashes reported 
in the newsletter GenetiX Update were from anonymous groups. Covert methods were 
favoured because the very low risk of arrest allowed those who could not risk charges to take 
part more easily, a point stressed in a field manual for covert crop-trashers (Anon n.d.). 
Insofar as the measures of success were preventing the crop from cross-pollinating and 
undermining the crop trials, it was argued that covert action was simply more effective 
because more plants could be destroyed (see the quotation above). These activists also argued 
that gXs was elitist, because only the able-bodied and those without mortgages and families 
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would be prepared to accept arrest and trial (Leeds Earth First!, 1998). Importantly, gXs was 
also challenged on ideological grounds: 
 
Covert action questions the legitimacy of the legal system’s handing out punishment 
— surely a necessary question to ask of an institution which has proved time and time 
again that its priorities are not to end injustice nor to stop ecological degradation. 
While the odds are stacked against us and the system does not share our interests, 
covert action has a part to play in an effective strategy.18 
 
This critique was also voiced in activist debates over tactics, such as at the Earth First! 
Gathering in 1998,19 and in interviews: 
 
if we’re gonna do criminal damage to my mind there are times and places to be 
accountable  
[…] 
and I don’t think being accountable to corporations is the right way to go about things 
[...] I think you have to be very careful of working with the media and working 
assuming that the judicial system, if you’re honest and doing the right thing, will back 
you up.20 
 
In France, too, the campaign’s emphasis on ‘civic disobedience’ has not been without 
challenge from within activist networks. First, there are significant differences in the 
conceptualisation of direct action between the FV campaign and Greenpeace France, which 
(at an organizational level) rejects mass collective crop destruction in favour of 
professionalised and media-oriented actions. Second, the FV campaign itself was subsequent 
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to divergences between two of the initial leaders, Bové and René Riesel, who split bitterly in 
1999 over the legitimacy of the state to take public policy decisions over biotechnology. 
Riesel, perhaps best described politically as an anarcho-situationist, remains highly critical of 
‘citizen’ politics, arguing that organizations such as the CP are still wedded to a concept of an 
all-encompassing state that has little to say about the alienating effects of ‘the system’.21 He 
thus rejects the FV campaign’s acceptance of the use of GMOs in medical research in the 
laboratory, and of any strategy which sees the state as a potential regulatory ally. At local 
level, there were frequent covert actions at both the start of the decade, and in 2006-07 in 
particular, as some activists became frustrated with the openness of the campaign (as activists 
were regularly greeted at pre-announced crop-trashes by gendarmes and pro-GMO farmers). 
One group published a nocturnal crop-trash charter in summer 2007,22 extolling autonomy 
and anonymity and rejecting collective decision-making and submission to arrest, arguing 
that covert action by a ‘self-managing collective’ is more effective than (what it perceived to 
be) a ‘bureaucratic and hierarchical’ national organization.23 
 
In both countries, therefore, there were divisions over tactics and the ideological principles 
that justified them. Yet whilst in the UK, the argument essentially took place within an 
anarchistic network about what forms of protest were consistent with their shared critique of 
the state, in France the argument essentially took place amongst groups with contrasting 
critiques of the state. In the UK, although public symbolic actions by Greenpeace, gXs and 
others received considerable media coverage, the majority of actions were covert and 






What then does our evidence tell us? First, it tells us that systemic structural differences are 
crucial to understanding the differential prosecution outcomes for social movement actors. 
Moreover, systemic differences are stable, predictable, and consistent; we believe, therefore, 
that the concept of a judicial opportunity structure can be a valid and useful one for 
understanding the trajectories and outcomes of direct action campaigns in particular, and is 
analytically distinct from the litigation-focused concept of ‘legal opportunity structure’. 
Second, however, our evidence tells us that movement tactical choices cannot simply be read 
off from these systemic properties; in the case of the anti-GMO campaigns in the three 
countries studied, we see activist tactics which are themselves consistent, but are not 
consistent with the expectations derived from the criminal justice systems.  
 
There are three reasons why this might be: (i) activists are unaware of the organization of the 
criminal justice system; (ii) they are aware of it, but misperceive how it operates; (iii) they 
perceive it correctly, but their crop-trashing tactics are not pre-determined by it. As should be 
evident from our discussion, we are reasonably confident that neither (i) nor (ii) are valid 
here; indeed, at the FV annual meeting in 2011,24 there was sustained collective discussion of 
the fine detail of arrest and trial, including discussion of the precise form of words best used 
in custody to maximise the chances of producing a collective prosecution (thus recognising 
how the criminal justice system operates) coupled with continued debate over the 
effectiveness of prosecutions in achieving movement goals (thus relating outcomes to tactical 
choice).25 The evidence from both our cases overwhelmingly supports (iii), and specifically 
that debates over ideas within movements are decisive in explaining tactical choice. As we 
have seen, most British activists spurned the openings potentially provided by acquittals and 
the reluctance of judges to impose more than token penalties, whereas French activists 
instrumentalized court cases as occasions to reinforce collective identity and maintain 
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political pressure. The reasons explaining tactical choice thus only become evident when 
examining the internal debates within each movement. 
 
We referred at the outset to the difficulty of sorting out the appropriate mix in the 
determination of activist tactical choice (Johnston, 2011, p.49). No answer to that problem is 
likely to apply to all cases, but we suggest in this case that activist ideas are fundamental to 
their perception of whether the criminal justice system provides an opportunity or threat the 
realisation of their political goals. To be sure, this does not mean that structures are not 
important, or that ideas alone explain tactical choices. First, because the results of court cases 
are central to our understanding of group mobilization: as noted above, movement actors are 
cognisant of the likely outcomes of arrest and trial, and make tactical choices that are 
informed by these consequences, and this is true irrespective of the counter-intuitive nature of 
these choices. Second, because ideas are not negotiated outwith specific cultural contexts; 
social movement actors in each country acted in ways that were consistent with particular 
social movement traditions, which we can see as a useful ‘bridging concept’ between 
structure and culture (see Doherty & Hayes, 2011).  
 
As Polletta argues, cultural traditions, arrangements, codes and so on may be considered 
structuring in that they are supraindividual; political structures and embedded ways of acting 
are themselves a product of culturally specific development (1999, pp.67-9). Clearly, in our 
cases, the political traditions of each state are different; a Republican narrative of active 
citizenship may be considered to be structuring for contentious action in France (see, for 
example, Hewlett, 1998, pp.11-35), and this is not available to activists in the UK. Moreover, 
these ideas are negotiated within specific movement-organisational contexts: there is no 
direct equivalent in the UK of the Confédération paysanne; there was no counterpart in 
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France of the 1980s British peace movement, for example. In France, the Faucheurs 
Volontaires campaign sought regulatory intervention from the state; in the UK, most anti-
GMO activists and their precursors saw themselves as radicals, essentially different from the 
rest of society, and viewed the state as an instrument of global capital and corporations. In 
this sense their tactics might be construed as an instance of ‘path dependency’ (Pierson, 
2000). But as we have shown in our discussion on effectiveness and accountability, there is 
nothing inevitable about the positions adopted by either movement; in both cases, the 
dominant ideological position was contested, and movement tactics were produced by a 
process of challenge and negotiation. 
 
It is possible that the example of the anti-GMO campaigns in the UK and France provides a 
unique case. We rather doubt it, however. It is true that the FV campaign is distinctive in its 
offensive use of the court as a venue for challenge, but there have been a number of other 
cases in recent years in the UK and France in which those arrested for protests (against the 
arms trade, on climate change, or in anti-advertising actions, for example) have sought to turn 
criminal defence into political attack, using prosecution to establish the legitimacy of their 
position and to mobilize wider support. In particular, the availability of jury trials appears to 
increase the chances of success in the courthouse, demonstrating the importance of judicial 
structures for the analysis of social movements, and the potential political outcomes of 
deliberate collective law breaking. However, how social movement actors choose to exploit 
these judicial opportunities is dependent not just on external structuring factors, but on the 
negotiation of ideas – about identity, about the nature of accountability, about effectiveness – 
within specific movement settings. We hope further work will address both how prosecution 
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